We investigate the extent to which monetary policy can enhance the functioning of the private credit system. Speci…cally, we characterize the optimal return on money in the presence of credit arrangements. There is a dual role for credit: It allows buyers to trade without …at money and also permits them to borrow against future income.
INTRODUCTION
In most modern economies, we have observed the rise of credit arrangements as a means of payment in the past two decades. Consequently, the increased number of transactions involving some kind of credit instrument has fundamentally changed the way in which economists approach monetary economies, leading to a growing literature that investigates the implications of the use of both …at money and credit as a means of payment. Some papers in this literature include: Shi (1996) ; Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998) Some economists have even argued that …at money is likely to be displaced by other forms of money in the near future. Woodford (2000) provides a useful survey of the debate and discusses some of the implications for monetary policy. The main reason to believe that …at money is still useful in transactions is twofold. First, it is costly to implement any kind of credit arrangement. For instance, the use of credit requires the construction of a record of transactions as well as the creation of a legal framework to enforce the repayment of liabilities, devoting a signi…cant amount of resources to these activities. Second, the conduct of monetary policy is likely to a¤ect the agents'incentives to use the private credit system, even in a world in which the use of credit as a means of payment is predominant.
In this paper, we take the view that …at money complements the use of credit in transactions and investigate the extent to which monetary policy can enhance the functioning of the credit system. Speci…cally, we want to characterize the optimal return on money in a world in which private credit and …at money coexist as alternative means of payment. We construct a model in which traders have access to a costly technology that allows them to publicly report their transactions. As a result, these agents may be willing to voluntarily report (at a cost) their trades, together with their identities, to others if such an action allows them to have access to credit. Because agents cannot commit to their future promises and trading opportunities arrive at random, a centralized settlement system along the lines of Cavalcanti, Erosa, and Temzelides (1999) is su¢ cient to enforce the repayment of private liabilities. The record-keeping technology to which agents have access in our model is similar to the one in Monnet and Roberds (2008) , Nosal and Rocheteau (2011) , and Li (2011) . In particular, a subset of sellers have the ability to verify the identity of their trading partners and publicly report their transactions. If a buyer trades with one of these sellers, then he can choose whether he wants to have his trade reported to others at a cost. If the buyer chooses to report his trade, then he can induce the seller to produce more goods than what his money balances allow him to purchase because he can also promise to make a repayment at a future date.
Alternative credit arrangements have been studied in the literature. In particular, searchtheoretic models such as Shi (1996) and Corbae and Ritter (2004) have addressed the issue of the coexistence of …at money and credit. These authors focus on decentralized credit arrangements that rely either on long-term relationships [Corbae and Ritter (2004) ] or on the pledge of collateral [Shi (1996) ] to induce cooperation in the credit system. As opposed to these authors, we analyze a centralized credit system that also has the advantage of allowing a central bank to implement certain kinds of policies. We want to focus on the implications of these policies for the functioning of the credit system.
As a benchmark, we characterize the equilibrium allocations in a pure credit economy.
Because not all sellers are able to publicly report their trades (due to a technological restriction), buyers face consumption risk when trading bilaterally. Also, because of limited commitment, there can be equilibria in which buyers are credit-constrained, in which case they consume less than the unconstrained e¢ cient quantity. Then, we show that the introduction of …at money allows buyers to self-insure against the risk of being matched with a seller who is unable to o¤er him credit. The introduction of …at money eliminates consumption risk, but the quantity consumed is below the unconstrained e¢ cient quantity.
We conclude that there may be a role for policy intervention. It is now critical to de…ne the way in which the government or monetary authority can intervene in the economy.
In particular, we impose two constraints on the implementation of policies. First, any intervention must result in a net transfer of assets to private agents in order to respect incentive compatibility. This is in line with Andolfatto (2010) , who imposes voluntary trade as a restriction on the set of incentive-feasible policies to rule out lump-sum tax as an instrument. 1 In addition to voluntary trade, it makes sense in our environment to impose a second constraint on the government's ability to interact with private agents: Any transfer of assets to private agents must be conditional on the available public information. We motivate this constraint on the government policies as essentially a technological restriction that limits the extent to which the government can make transfers to private agents to alter the rate of return on money. We believe this is a relevant constraint in the context of a credit economy in which it is costly to report private trades. Furthermore by considering this extra constraint, we are imposing that the government is not endowed with extra costless informational resources while still preserving the underlying frictions faced by private agents. Andolfatto (2010) has shown that a nonlinear monetary mechanism involving the payment of interest on money holdings can implement the unconstrained e¢ cient allocation in a pure monetary economy even if lump-sum taxes cannot be used as an instrument. By making interest payments to money holders, it is possible to equalize the real rate of return on money with the rate of time preference (the Friedman rule). Andolfatto's mechanism allows the monetary authority to control, in the long run, both the real return on money and the in ‡ation rate. His results critically depend on the monetary authority's ability to evenly raise the real return on money across all money holders. We restrict attention to the same monetary mechanism and add the restriction that interest payments can be made only to those who report their trades. As a result, the monetary authority is unable to uniformly raise the real return on money across all money holders so that we preserve a social role for credit arrangements.
In the presence of the implementation restrictions we have described, we show that an active monetary policy is su¢ cient for relaxing the credit constraints. By e¤ectively raising the real return on money for the subgroup of agents who currently have the opportunity of trading within the credit/payment system, the monetary authority guarantees that the unconstrained e¢ cient quantity is traded in each bilateral match in which buyers are able to use credit. Because a de ‡ationary policy is not incentive-feasible, the monetary authority is unable to (indirectly) raise the real return on money for those who currently do not have an opportunity of using the credit/payment system. As a result, it cannot completely eliminate consumption risk so that the unconstrained e¢ cient allocation is not incentive-feasible.
We then characterize the optimal monetary policy. We show that equalizing the real rate of return on money with the rate of time preference (Friedman rule) is incentive-feasible only for those who currently have an opportunity of using the credit/payment system. Moreover, this is only a necessary condition for optimality. Another property of the optimal monetary policy is to have a positive in ‡ation rate. In particular, the monetary authority should optimally choose the minimum in ‡ation rate that ensures that buyers who use credit have the incentive to fully repay their debts.
Why is it necessary to have a positive in ‡ation rate? Introducing …at money into a credit economy gives agents an alternative (decentralized) mechanism to trade. As we have seen, …at money allows agents to self-insure against the risk of not being able to use credit in some transactions, and their ability to self-insure crucially depends on the real return on money.
It is very di¢ cult to induce buyers to repay their liabilities when the alternative to credit is trading with …at money in an environment in which the in ‡ation rate is virtually zero (especially if buyers are su¢ ciently patient). For this reason, a slightly positive in ‡ation rate is required to support cooperation in the credit system. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the model. In section 3, we characterize equilibria for the pure credit economy. In section 4, we introduce …at money and study its implications for the credit system. In sections 5 and 6, we characterize the optimal monetary policy. In section 7, we discuss the properties of the optimal policy and the nature of our monetary mechanism. Section 8 concludes.
THE MODEL

Agents
Our framework builds on Lagos and Wright (2005) and Rocheteau and Wright (2005) .
There is a continuum of in…nitely lived buyers and sellers. Each buyer is indexed by i 2 [0; 1]
and each seller is indexed by j 2 [0; 1]. Time is discrete, and each period is divided into two subperiods: day and night. Within each subperiod, there is a unique perishable consumption good that is produced and consumed. In the day subperiod, a seller does not want to consume but can produce one unit of the consumption good with one unit of e¤ort; a buyer wants to consume but is unable to produce. In the night subperiod, both types want to consume and are able to produce one unit of the consumption good with one unit of e¤ort.
Each agent is endowed with N units of e¤ort. Neither a buyer nor a seller can commit to his or her promises.
A buyer has preferences given by:
where q i 2 R + is his consumption in the day subperiod, c i is his consumption in the night subperiod, and n i 2 R is his production in the night subperiod. Assume that u : R + ! R + is strictly concave, increasing, and continuously di¤erentiable, with u(0) = 0 and u 0 (0) = 1.
A seller has the following utility function over goods and e¤ort:
where q j 2 R + is her production in the day subperiod, c j is her consumption in the night subperiod, and n j 2 R is her production in the night subperiod. Buyers and sellers have a common discount factor between periods, which we denote by 2 (0; 1).
Markets
Agents trade in two sequential markets in every period. In the day market, agents are randomly and bilaterally matched in such a way that each buyer meets a seller. In the night market, agents interact in a centralized location where the terms of trade are given by competitive pricing. As in Lagos and Wright (2005) , we refer to the …rst market as the decentralized market and to the second market as the centralized market.
Recordkeeping
There Notice that a connected seller is willing to extend credit to her trading partner in the decentralized market provided that society can enforce any repayment in the centralized location. One possible …nancial arrangement is to have a seller producing for the buyer with whom she is paired in the day subperiod in exchange for a repayment in the night subperiod. However, a buyer cannot commit to his promise of making a repayment in the night subperiod. To enforce the repayment of private liabilities, there must be some form of societal punishment on defaulters. Otherwise, a seller would not be willing to produce for a buyer in the decentralized market unless she received something tangible and valuable in exchange (such as …at money). This must be the case for an unconnected seller who is unable to make her trades publicly observable. On the other hand, a connected seller has the ability to make her transaction with a buyer publicly observable. If a buyer does not repay his loan, other agents in the economy will observe his defection. If there exists a mechanism that enforces any repayment in the centralized location, a connected seller is willing to extend credit to her trading partners in the decentralized market. In the next section, we provide more details on the exact punishment that society can impose on defaulters.
A PURE CREDIT ECONOMY
In this section, we discuss the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in a pure credit economy. We believe that the pure credit economy is a useful benchmark that will help us understand the role of government policies. To enforce the repayment of private liabilities, there is a clearinghouse that collects all reports from connected sellers during the day subperiod. The clearinghouse is also responsible for receiving repayments from buyers and making payments to sellers in the centralized location. Any transaction that is reported to the clearinghouse becomes publicly observable. Because a buyer cannot commit to his promises, the clearinghouse needs to impose some kind of punishment on him if he fails to make a repayment. It is not possible for the clearinghouse to directly punish a buyer who has defaulted on his loan. However, the clearinghouse can indirectly punish a defaulter by refusing to make a payment (in the centralized location) to any seller who trades with him.
Notice that the identity of a defaulter is publicly observable. As a result, a connected seller will not be willing to extend credit to a defaulter. To extend credit to him, the seller would have to report their transaction, together with their identities, to the clearinghouse, which would then refuse to make a transfer to the seller even if it received a repayment from the buyer in the centralized location. Thus, a buyer who reneges on her liability loses access to credit.
A buyer can choose whether to have his transaction with a connected seller reported to the clearinghouse. If the buyer chooses not to report his trade, then credit will not be available for him: The seller cannot enforce the repayment of a private liability in the centralized location and, as a result, is not willing to extend credit. Therefore, no trade takes place.
To determine the terms of trade in the decentralized market, we assume that the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to the seller, who either accepts or rejects it. 2 As a result, the buyer extracts all surplus from trade when proposing the terms of trade. This partic- 2 Here we implicitly assume that it is in…nitely costly for the buyer to make a second o¤er to the seller if the …rst one has been rejected. ular bargaining protocol simpli…es the analysis without compromising the generality of our results. In Lagos and Wright (2005) , there is an ine¢ ciency arising from the generalized Nash bargaining solution: If the seller has some bargaining power, the socially e¢ cient allocation cannot be implemented as a monetary equilibrium. 3 To concentrate on the informational frictions that we emphasize in this paper, we simplify the analysis by ruling out any potential bargaining ine¢ cient.
Bilateral Trade with an Unconnected Seller
Consider a match between a buyer and an unconnected seller. In this case, there is no possibility of making their trade publicly observable: The unconnected seller is unable to report their trade to the clearinghouse because she lacks the technology to record their transaction. As a result, such a seller is not willing to extend credit to the buyer; therefore, no trade takes place.
Bilateral Trade with a Connected Seller
Consider now a match between a buyer and a connected seller. Suppose initially that the buyer chooses to have his trade reported. Let q denote the quantity of the consumption good that the seller produces for the buyer in the day subperiod, and let l denote the repayment amount that the buyer promises to make in the night subperiod. Thus, the terms of trade (q; l) are determined as follows:
subject to the seller's individual rationality constraint,
and the buyer's individual rationality constraint,
Here v denotes the buyer's expected discounted utility at the end of the night subperiod, andv denotes his expected discounted utility upon default (given the punishment that the clearinghouse will impose on him). Condition (3) 
Buyer' s Bellman Equation
The buyer's problem can be formulated in terms of the following Bellman equation:
Notice that a buyer trades in the decentralized market only with probability . Notice also that a buyer always has the option of not having his trade reported, in which case no trade takes place. Thus, a trade happens if and only if the buyer's payo¤ r (v;v) is greater than zero.
The Value of Defection
As we have seen, the punishment imposed by the clearinghouse results in autarky for a buyer who reneges on his private liabilities. As we have mentioned, a buyer who defaults on his liabilities will no longer be able to trade in the decentralized market because connected sellers will refuse to extend him credit. Recall that the clearinghouse indirectly punishes defaulters by refusing to send payments to connected sellers who have traded with defaulters. This means that the clearinghouse refuses to settle any public transaction involving a defaulter. Thus, we must havev = 0.
Stationary Equilibrium
Now we are able to de…ne an equilibrium for the pure credit economy. Throughout the paper, we restrict attention to stationary equilibria. In particular, we can de…ne an equilibrium simply in terms of the value v (the buyer's expected discounted utility). Once we have determined the equilibrium value for v, we can easily recover the loan amount q as well as the repayment amount l observed in each transaction between a buyer and a connected seller.
De…nition 1 A stationary equilibrium of the pure credit economy is a value v satisfying
together with the condition v .
There can be two types of equilibria. Suppose that u (q ) (1 + ) (q + ).
Then, the equilibrium value for v is given by
In this case, the surplus-maximizing quantity q is traded in each bilateral match between a buyer and a connected seller. The repayment amount in the centralized location is given by q + . The buyer's individual rationality constraint does not bind so that he obtains enough credit to get the surplus-maximizing quantity q in the decentralized market.
Suppose now that u (q ) < (1 + ) (q + ). Then, the equilibrium value for v is given by
In this case, the quantity v < q is traded in each bilateral match between a buyer and a connected seller. The repayment amount is now given by v . The buyer's individual rationality constraint binds so that he is credit-constrained.
Discussion
In the pure credit economy, trade only takes place in matches involving connected sellers.
Because agents cannot commit to their future promises, credit is infeasible in transactions that cannot be publicly reported. This technological restriction introduces consumption risk for the buyer because with probability 1 he gets zero consumption. Notice that the extent to which consumption risk is a problem depends on the available record-keeping technology.
For instance, suppose that is very close to one. In this case, society has the ability to record almost all transactions, which mitigates the consumption risk that buyers face in decentralized exchange. On the other hand, if is close to zero, the consumption risk they face is severe. Notice that a lower value for makes the case u (q ) < (1 + ) (q + ) more likely to arise, which means that not only is credit unavailable in a (relatively large) fraction 1 of matches, but it is also restricted in the trades involving connected sellers.
The pure credit economy makes it clear why …at money can be socially useful. Fiat money allows two agents to trade even though no public information about their transactions is created. In particular, the only way to induce a seller to produce for a buyer is to have the latter giving something tangible and valuable in exchange, in which case settlement is immediate. As a result, the introduction of …at money enlarges the set of feasible trades, mitigating consumption risk in the decentralized market. We turn to the analysis of an economy in which …at money and private debt coexist as a means of payment in the next section.
INTRODUCING FIAT MONEY
Suppose now that each buyer is initially endowed with M units of money. Suppose also that there is no change in the initial stock of money; that is, there is no government intervention. As in the previous section, a buyer can choose whether to have his transaction with a connected seller reported to the clearinghouse. If the buyer chooses not to report his trade, then credit will not be available for him. In this case, the seller is willing to produce for the buyer only if she receives …at money in exchange. As in the pure credit economy, a credit transaction is incentive-feasible only in a bilateral meeting between a buyer and a connected seller. As in Lagos and Wright (2005) , there is a Walrasian market in the centralized location in which agents can trade goods for …at money at a competitive price.
Trades in this market are always anonymous.
Bilateral Trade with an Unconnected Seller
Consider the bargaining problem between a buyer and an unconnected seller. Let t denote the value of money in the centralized location at date t, and suppose that the buyer has M units of money. Let (q; D) denote the terms of trade; that is, q denotes the amount of goods that the seller produces for the buyer in exchange for D units of money. Taking t as given, the buyer's problem is:
and the buyer's cash constraint,
The solution to this problem is as follows: q = q and D = q = t if M q = t ; or q = t M and D = M if M < q = t . Finally, the buyer's payo¤ of trading with an unconnected seller is given by
Bilateral Trade with a Connected Seller
Now consider the bargaining problem between a buyer and a connected seller. First, we describe the solution to the bargaining problem, assuming that the buyer wants to have his trade reported. As in the previous section, let v denote the buyer's expected discounted utility at the end of the night subperiod, and letv denote his expected discounted utility upon default. The terms of trade are given by (q; L; D), where q is the quantity produced by the seller, D is the monetary transfer from the buyer to the seller in the decentralized market, and L is the monetary repayment that the buyer promises to make in the centralized location. Taking t , v,v as given, the buyer's problem is as follows:
the buyer's cash constraint (5) , and the buyer's individual rationality constraint,
Here the seller produces q units of the consumption good for the buyer in exchange for D units of money and a promise of repayment of L units of money in the centralized location. In the night subperiod, the buyer produces t L units of the good and exchange them in the Walrasian market for L units of money. Finally, he makes a transfer to the clearinghouse, which in turn makes a payment L to the seller with whom he was paired in the day subperiod. There is no cost of operating the clearinghouse other than the cost of reporting a transaction. A seller needs to pay > 0 to report her transaction with her trading partner in the decentralized market, which makes it harder to satisfy her individual rationality constraint. Because (7) holds with equality at the optimum, the buyer ends up paying for the record-keeping cost. The bene…t of having his trade reported is that the buyer can consume more than what his money holdings permit him to purchase because he can promise to make a repayment to the seller in the centralized location through the clearinghouse. Although credit is costly for the buyer, it allows him to relax his cash constraint.
The unconstrained solution to the bargaining problem is t L + t D = q . This means that, if t M < q , then we must have D = M and L > 0 at the optimum. Thus, we can rewrite the buyer's problem as
subject to (8) . The solution to this problem is: In this case, any trade proposed by the buyer involving a positive repayment amount will be rejected by the seller. Thus, the buyer's problem is the same as the one he faces when meeting with an unconnected seller in the decentralized market.
Buyer' s Bellman Equation
Throughout the paper, we restrict attention to stationary monetary equilibria in which aggregate real money balances are constant over time. In this kind of equilibrium, each buyer anticipates that the value of money in the centralized location will be constant over time: t = > 0 for all t 0. Thus, the buyer's problem in the centralized location can be expressed in terms of the following Bellman equation:
with r t+1 (M; v;v) given by (9) and a t+1 (M ) given by (6) . Here M is the amount of money that the buyer acquires in the Walrasian market at date t and takes with him into the decentralized market at date t + 1. Let M denote his optimal choice of money holdings in the Walrasian market. Now we make the same change of variables as in Sanches and Williamson (2010) 
In this case, the buyer chooses to report his trade with a connected seller to other agents in order to have access to credit. We can rewrite equation (10) in terms of x and y as follows:
with the buyer's individual rationality constraint (8) given by
When making his portfolio decision in the centralized location at date t, a buyer …nds it optimal to carry some currency into the decentralized market at date t + 1 because he may be matched with an unconnected seller (with probability 1 ). In this case, trade takes place only if he has money to pay for his purchases. Even in a trade with a connected seller that is reported to the clearinghouse, the buyer may use both credit and …at money to pay for the amount y that the seller produces for him.
Suppose now that, at the optimum, we have
In this case, the cost associated with credit exceeds the bene…t of trading with credit. As a result, the buyer never reports his trade when he is paired with a connected seller. Thus, he always uses …at money to pay for his purchases in the decentralized market. We can then rewrite equation (10) as follows:
with the value of x given by
For …at money and private debt to coexist as a means of payment, the following must hold in equilibrium:
Otherwise, an equilibrium is one in which all trades in the decentralized market are carried out with …at money only.
The Value of Defection
If a buyer fails to make a repayment in the centralized location, he will be able to use only …at currency to pay for his future purchases. When a buyer fails to make a repayment, the clearinghouse makes his defection publicly observable. This means that, if a defaulter wants to have any of his future trades reported, his identity will be revealed to his trading partner. The latter (a connected seller) knows that the clearinghouse will refuse to make her a transfer in the centralized location even if a repayment is actually collected from the buyer. Because the proposed trade would involve a positive repayment amount (otherwise, the buyer would prefer not to report the trade), she would get a negative payo¤ if she carried out the proposed trade. As a result, the seller will not accept the terms proposed by the buyer. Taking this into account, a defaulter who is paired with a connected seller chooses not to have his trade reported to the clearinghouse because this option would involve a cost without any additional bene…t. Thus, the value of defectionv satis…es the following
Let z denote the buyer's consumption following defection. Then, we can rewrite (13) as follows:
A defaulter produces and sells z units of the consumption good in the Walrasian market in order to acquire enough money balances at date t to purchase z units of the good in the decentralized market at date t + 1. We have that z =x, withx satisfying (11).
Stationary Monetary Equilibrium
The distribution of money holdings at the end of the night subperiod is such that every buyer holds the same amount of money and sellers carry no money into the decentralized market. This result is a direct consequence of the quasilinearity with respect to e¤ort and of the fact that agents have periodic access to centralized trade; see Lagos and Wright (2005) and Rocheteau and Wright (2005) . Hence, we can characterize an equilibrium allocation in terms of the daytime consumption y of a buyer who has his trade reported and the daytime consumption x of a buyer who does not have his trade reported, together with the daytime consumption z that a buyer would get had he defaulted on his liabilities.
De…nition 2 A stationary monetary equilibrium with credit is a triple (x; y; z), with z =x, satisfying the nonnegativity of the repayment amount
the …rst-order condition for the optimal choice of money balances,
and the buyer's individual rationality constraint
with y = q if (16) does not bind.
Notice that (14) and (16) imply that (12) holds. An equilibrium in which …at money and private debt are used as a means of payment has to be one in which a buyer who is paired with a connected seller …nds it optimal to have his trade reported, despite the costs associated with this choice. Equations (15) and (16) characterize the consumption plans x and y. Note that if we set y = q , we obtain x from (15). If (14) and (16) are satis…ed, then the socially e¢ cient quantity q is traded in each bilateral trade between a buyer and a connected seller. Otherwise, (15) and (16) holding with equality determine the values of x and y. If there exists no (x; y; z) satisfying (14)- (16), together with z =x, then an equilibrium is one in which all trades in the decentralized market are carried out with …at money: Buyers never report their trades to the clearinghouse and, as a result, credit disappears. In this equilibrium, the quantityx is traded in every meeting in the decentralized market. In the night subperiod, each buyer then producesx and each seller consumesx.
With the introduction of …at money, a buyer who now …nds himself matched with an unconnected seller in the decentralized market can use his money holdings to trade. Consequently, …at money can be used to self-insure against the risk of being matched with an unconnected seller. However, there is a limit to the extent to which buyers can use …at money to self-insure. In particular, notice that, in an equilibrium in which …at money and private debt coexist, we have x y, which means that a buyer who reports his trade is able to consume more than a buyer who cannot obtain credit from his trading partner.
From a buyer's standpoint, there still exists consumption risk. A buyer who trades with an unconnected seller faces a cash constraint that can eventually bind. On the other hand, a buyer who trades with a connected seller can promise to make a repayment in the centralized location in order to consume more than what his money holdings permit him to purchase. So long as the repayment amount is individually rational, a buyer who trades with a connected seller will be able to consume more in the day market.
Although the possibility of trading with credit on the decentralized market may seem attractive for buyers, the following result shows that there can be no equilibrium in which money and private debt coexist.
Proposition 3
With a constant money supply, the unique stationary monetary equilibrium is a pure monetary equilibrium in which the quantityx is traded in the decentralized market.
Let us carefully explain the previous result, which may seem surprising initially. To prove Proposition 2, we essentially showed that the buyer's individual rationality constraint cannot be satis…ed in equilibrium so that there is no incentive-feasible repayment amount.
Why is it so di¢ cult to satisfy (16) ? Notice that on the right-hand side of (16) we no longer have the payo¤ of autarky for the buyer as we had in the pure credit economy. In fact, the buyer's outside option consists of exclusively using money to trade in an environment in which the value of money is constant over time. On the left-hand side, we have the buyer's disutility of repaying the loan amount y x + plus the value of continuing to trade using credit. With a stable value of money (zero in ‡ation), agents are able to self-insure at a low cost, e¤ectively raising the value of default. As a result, each buyer has an additional incentive to default on his liabilities. Because sellers anticipate this, they extend no credit in the decentralized market.
With the introduction of …at money, we have essentially provided households with an alternative mechanism to trade on the decentralized market. As a result, this has critically a¤ected the functioning of the credit system. In particular, the credit system is not used because now it is more di¢ cult to induce buyers to cooperate. 4 As we will show later, it is necessary to implement a positive in ‡ation rate to induce buyers to fully repay their liabilities when they use credit.
Even though the introduction of …at money eliminates consumption risk, buyers consume less than the unconstrained e¢ cient quantity q . In the next section, we study how policy intervention can a¤ect the functioning of the private credit system.
WELFARE-IMPROVING POLICIES WITH IMPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION
In this section, we discuss the possibility of government intervention. We want to investigate the extent to which a policy intervention can improve upon the laissez-faire economy by altering the real rate of return on money. To be in line with the recent literature on optimal policy, we want to clearly de…ne what is actually incentive-feasible for the government. In particular, we focus on two constraints.
First, any intervention must result in a net transfer of …at money to private agents in order to respect voluntary trade. This is in line with Andolfatto (2010) , who imposes voluntary trade as a restriction on the set of incentive-feasible policies to rule out lump-sum tax as an instrument. In addition to voluntary trade, it makes sense in our environment to impose a second constraint on the government's ability to intervene in the economy: We assume that any transfer of assets to private agents must be conditional on the available public information. We motivate this constraint on the government policies as essentially a technological restriction that limits the extent to which the government can make transfers to private agents to alter the rate of return on money. We believe this is a relevant constraint in the context of a credit economy in which it is costly for agents to report their trades.
As a result, any information the government has about the economy is necessarily reported by agents so that the government needs to interact with the clearinghouse to implement any policy: The transfer of assets can be made only to those who have reported their trades and identities to the clearinghouse. Recall that the clearinghouse keeps a public record of reports and identities.
We consider the same monetary mechanism as Andolfatto (2010) Notice that this kind of intervention creates an additional incentive for agents to report their trades: Not only do public transactions allow credit arrangements within the private sector, but they also permit an agent to receive a net transfer of …at money. The government can intervene in the economy only if the clearinghouse is used to settle private transactions.
The government can induce agents to report their trades by paying interest on money holdings; that is, the bene…t of reporting a trade is not only to have access to credit but also to be able to receive an interest payment. However, if it is very expensive to report a transaction, then a buyer who is paired with a connected seller may prefer not to use credit nor to receive an interest payment; as a result, the clearinghouse is not used. In this case, all trade is carried out with …at currency. Thus, all transactions in the economy are anonymous and the government cannot intervene.
Government' s Budget Constraint
The government's budget constraint is given by
We have anticipated that, in a monetary equilibrium, all buyers who have access to credit choose to use it by reporting their trades to the clearinghouse. We have also anticipated that, at the beginning of the day subperiod at date t, each buyer holds M t 1 units of money and that sellers carry no money into the decentralized market. We will show later that, in a monetary equilibrium, this will be the endogenous distribution of money holdings across agents at the beginning of the day subperiod. As a result, aggregate interest payments are given by (R 1) M t 1 , with an aggregate revenue from the redemption fee equal to T t .
We restrict attention to monetary policy rules for which the money supply grows at a constant gross rate > 0 ( M t = M t 1 for all t 0) and the gross interest rate is constant over time (R t = R 1 for all t 0). As in the previous section, let t denote the value of money in the centralized location at date t. Thus, we can rewrite the government's budget constraint in real terms as follows:
Bilateral Trade with an Unconnected Seller
The terms of trade are exactly the same as in section 4.1.
Bilateral Trade with a Connected Seller
Here we describe the bargaining problem between a buyer and a connected seller. Suppose initially that the buyer wants to have his trade reported. De…ne ' t (D) = max fD; R t D T t g.
Taking t , T t , R t , v,v as given, the buyer solves the following problem:
the buyer's cash constraint (5), and the buyer's individual rationality constraint (8) . As in the previous section, v denotes the buyer's expected discounted utility at the end of the night subperiod, andv denotes his expected discounted utility upon default. If the buyer chooses not to trade with the seller in the day subperiod, he will not be able to receive interest payments because there will be no transaction to be reported to the clearinghouse.
For this reason, the buyer's surplus from trade is given by
Now if t max fR t M T t ; M g < q , then we must have D = M and L > 0 at the optimum. Then, we can rewrite the buyer's problem as:
subject to (8) . If the constraint (8) binds, we have that L = (v v) = t . Otherwise, the repayment amount is given by
Again, let r t (M; v;v) denote the buyer's payo¤ from trading with a connected seller when the trade is reported to the clearinghouse. Finally, the seller sends the report f(i; j) ; (q; D; L)g to the clearinghouse.
Suppose now that the buyer chooses not to have his trade reported to the clearinghouse.
Then, the buyer's problem is the same as the one he faces when meeting with an unconnected seller.
Buyer' s Bellman Equation
Each buyer takes the value of money f t g 1 t=0 and the monetary policy variables M t ; T t ; R t 1 t=0
as given when making his individual decisions. The buyer's problem can be formulated in terms of the following Bellman equation:
Given v andv, let M denote the solution to the maximization problem on the right-hand side of (18) . Conjecture that, in a monetary equilibrium, agents …nd it optimal to exercise the option of receiving interest payments from the government. As in the previous section, let y denote the buyer's daytime consumption if he reports his trade to the clearinghouse, and let x denote his daytime consumption if he does not report the trade. Suppose that at the optimum we have
In this case, the buyer …nds it optimal to have his trade reported. Thus, we can rewrite (18) as
with the buyer's individual rationality constraint given by
We have that y = q if the buyer's individual rationality constraint does not bind so that the socially e¢ cient quantity will be traded in each bilateral meeting that is reported to the clearinghouse.
Suppose now that at the optimum we have
In this case, the buyer …nds it optimal not to have his trade reported: He prefers to exclusively trade with money regardless of the type of his trading partner in the next decentralized market. Then, we can rewrite (18) as
withx given by
In this case, a buyer who is paired with a connected seller chooses not to report his trade so that he exclusively uses …at money to pay for his purchases in the decentralized market.
Finally, for …at money and private debt to coexist as means of payment, the following condition must hold in equilibrium:
Otherwise, an equilibrium is one in which all trades in the decentralized market are carried out with …at money. Condition (20) says that, when choosing how much money to carry into the decentralized market, a buyer prefers to have his trade reported when matched with a connected seller over not having it reported and trading with …at money only.
The Value of Defection
As in the previous section, if a buyer fails to make a repayment in the centralized location, then he will be able to use only …at money to pay for his future purchases. Here we also assume that the government refuses to make interest payments to a defaulter. 5 Thus, the value of defectionv satis…es the following Bellman equation:
As in the previous section, let z denote the buyer's consumption following defection. Then, we can rewrite (21) as
Upon defaulting on his private liability, a buyer produces and sells z units of the consumption good in the Walrasian market to acquire money balances at date t. Then, he takes these proceeds into the decentralized market at date t + 1 to purchase z units of the good.
Notice that z =x.
Stationary Monetary Equilibrium
In a stationary monetary equilibrium, the distribution of money holdings across agents at the beginning of the day subperiod at date t is such that each buyer holds M t 1 units of money and sellers have no money. The distribution of money holdings at the beginning of the night subperiod at date t is such that each seller holds M t units of money and buyers have no money. An agent …nds it optimal to receive interest payments if and only if (R 1) x T 0. Using (17), this condition holds if and only if:
For a monetary equilibrium to exist, we also need to have that:
at each date t. Otherwise, agents would demand an in…nite amount of money in the Walrasian market, and, as a consequence, a monetary equilibrium would not exist. In a stationary monetary equilibrium, we can rewrite (24) as follows:
A stationary monetary equilibrium in which aggregate real money balances are constant over time necessarily satis…es (25). Notice that (25) simply says that the real return on money cannot exceed the agents'rate of time preference.
Finally, a government's policy ( ; R) needs to satisfy (22), (23), and (25) to be incentivefeasible.
De…nition 4
For any given incentive-feasible policy ( ; R), a stationary monetary equilibrium with credit is a triple (x; y; z), with z =x, satisfying the nonnegativity of the repayment amount,
(1 ) (1 )
with y = q if (28) does not bind.
Notice that condition (28) is simply the buyer's individual rationality constraint stated in terms of the quantities x and y. Notice also that (26) and (28) imply that (20) holds. If an equilibrium with credit exists, then we can have either an unconstrained equilibrium (in which case the buyer gets y = q from a connected seller) or a constrained equilibrium (in which case the buyer gets y < q from a connected seller). If a stationary monetary equilibrium with credit does not exist, then the unique stationary equilibrium is a pure monetary equilibrium in which the quantityx is traded in each bilateral meeting in the decentralized market. In this case, there can be no intervention because no public information is created (all trades are anonymous) so that the money supply remains constant over time.
In an equilibrium in which …at money and private debt coexist, we have that x y, which means that a buyer who reports his trade to the clearinghouse is able to consume more than a buyer who cannot obtain credit from his trading partner. A buyer who trades with an unconnected seller faces a cash constraint that can eventually bind. On the other hand, a buyer who trades with a connected seller can promise to make a repayment in the centralized location in order to consume more than what his money holdings permit him to purchase in the decentralized market. So long as the repayment amount is individually rational, a buyer who trades with a connected seller will be able to consume more in the day subperiod.
OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY
In this section, we characterize the optimal policy rule subject to the implementation constraint that all trade has to be voluntary and that all monetary transfers to private agents have to be conditional on the available public information. The social welfare associated with an equilibrium with credit (x; y; z) is given by
and the social welfare associated with an equilibrium without credit is given by
Without a credit system, the only allocation that can be implemented (other than autarky)
is one in which each buyer getsx from a seller in the decentralized market and producesx in the centralized location. All trades are anonymous so that the private sector does not create any public information on which the government can condition its transfers.
Notice that x = y = q maximizes the social welfare associated with an equilibrium with credit. If we can implement the socially e¢ cient quantity q , then the maximum welfare level is given by
We say that a society has a low record-keeping cost if the following holds:
In this case, the equilibrium with credit dominates the pure monetary equilibrium without intervention, provided that the socially e¢ cient quantity q can be implemented by an incentive-feasible policy. Thus, our …rst step is to verify whether the socially e¢ cient quantity can indeed be implemented.
Lemma 5 x x in an unconstrained monetary stationary equilibrium, with x =x if and only if (25) holds with equality.
The previous result shows that we must have x =x = q in order to implement the socially e¢ cient allocation. However, we show next that there is no incentive-feasible policy that can implement x =x = q as an unconstrained equilibrium.
Proposition 6
The unconstrained e¢ cient allocation cannot be implemented as a stationary monetary equilibrium.
It is not possible for the government to eliminate the consumption risk that a buyer faces in the decentralized market (in an unconstrained equilibrium). With probability , a buyer consumes q because his trade is reported to the clearinghouse, and with probability 1 , he consumes less than q because his money holdings are insu¢ cient to purchase the quantity q from his trading partner. The government cannot induce him to carry more money balances into the decentralized market so that the e¢ cient quantity cannot be traded in a bilateral meeting between a buyer and an unconnected seller.
We now characterize the optimal monetary policy rule under the assumption that the buyers have CRRA preferences. The optimal monetary policy requires (25) to hold with equality so that we can guarantee that the buyer's daytime consumption when trading with an unconnected seller is the highest possible. This is the way in which we can implement the Friedman rule without resorting to lump-sum taxes.
Proposition 7 For small and , there exists a unique > 1 such that, with x =x and y = q , (26) holds as a strict inequality and (28) holds with equality. As a result, (x; y; z) = (x; q ;x) is an unconstrained stationary monetary equilibrium in which the repayment amount is strictly positive.
With CRRA preferences, the repayment amount in an unconstrained equilibrium is strictly increasing in the money growth factor , which means that the higher the longrun in ‡ation rate (which is also given by ), the larger the repayment amount is. As we would expect, credit becomes relatively more important in transactions as the in ‡ation rate rises. Notice that the buyer's individual rationality constraint can be satis…ed only for values of above the threshold value , which means that a stationary monetary equilibrium in which the credit system is operative exists if and only if the money growth factor is su¢ ciently large (in particular, above the threshold value ).
Notice that there are two e¤ects on the buyer's incentives to move away from credit as we vary . First, a higher return on money (lower for any given R) gives agents an additional incentive to default on their liabilities and, consequently, abandon the credit system. Second, a higher return on money lowers the buyer's opportunity cost of holding such an asset, making it more valuable as an alternative to credit. Lenders (sellers) are aware of this e¤ect and, consequently, reduce the loan amounts they are willing to extend.
Finally, we need to verify whether the welfare associated with the allocation (x; q ;x) is greater than the welfare associated with the equilibrium without credit (the pure monetary equilibriumx). Speci…cally, we need to verify whether the following holds:
The left-hand side of (32) gives the expected surplus from trade associated with an equilibrium in which …at money and credit coexist as a means of payment, whereas the right-hand side of (32) gives the expected surplus associated with the pure monetary economy. Notice that q is the surplus-maximizing quantity so that u (q ) q > u (x) x. However, condition (32) may not hold when the cost is relatively large.
Proposition 8 Suppose that is su¢ ciently close to one and is su¢ ciently small such that (32) holds. Let > 1 be the threshold value for the money growth factor as de…ned in Proposition 5. Letx be given by
Then, the allocation (x; q ;x) achieves the highest welfare level.
This means that only a society with a su¢ ciently sophisticated record-keeping technology can bene…t from public transactions. Not only do public transactions allow credit arrangements within the private sector, but they also permit the government to alter the rate of return on money. If the number of transactions that is reported in equilibrium is large relative to those that are anonymous, then the impact of the policy rule ( ; R) = ; 1 on social welfare is bigger. This means that public trades are socially desirable so long as the cost of reporting private trades is low and the relative fraction of these trades is su¢ ciently large.
DISCUSSION
In the pure credit economy, buyers not only face consumption risk in the decentralized market, but they also may consume less than the surplus-maximizing quantity q in a credit trade if they are credit-constrained. Thus, we conclude that, regardless of the available record-keeping technology, there is a social role for …at money in transactions and for an active monetary policy. Indeed, we have shown that it is possible to implement welfareimproving policies even if we restrict these policies to respect voluntary trade and the constraint that all transfers to private agents must be contingent on the available public information. In particular, it is necessary to have an active monetary policy to guarantee that the surplus-maximizing quantity q is traded in each match involving a connected seller
In Andolfatto (2010), any incentive-feasible policy rule for which R= = 1 (a version of the Friedman rule) implements the unconstrained e¢ cient allocation in a pure monetary economy. In particular, the monetary authority can implement such an allocation with zero in ‡ation by setting ( ; R) = 1; 1 . As a result, there is no social role for credit.
Andolfatto's results depend crucially on the assumption that the monetary authority is able to evenly raise the real return on money across all money holders. In our analysis, we impose the constraint that the transfers to agents have to be conditional on the available public information. Because the record-keeping technology is not available to all sellers, the monetary authority is unable to directly raise the real return on money for the subgroup of traders who temporarily cannot report their trades. Notice that, in principle, it could indirectly raise the real return on money for this subgroup of agents by means of a de ‡a-tionary policy. But we have shown that such a policy is not incentive-feasible under the implementation restrictions we have considered.
We have shown that setting R= = 1 (Friedman rule) does not implement the unconstrained e¢ cient allocation (Proposition 6). As we have seen, this policy equalizes the real rate of return on money with the rate of time preference only for the subgroup of traders who are currently able to report their trades. From Proposition 7, a necessary and su¢ -cient condition for optimality is to have both R= = 1 and = > 1. This means that a slightly positive in ‡ation rate is required to support cooperation in the credit system; that is, an in ‡ation rate of at least is required to guarantee that the buyer's individual rationality constraint is satis…ed so that credit transactions are indeed incentive-feasible.
Why should the monetary authority choose the minimum incentive-feasible in ‡ation rate consistent with an unconstrained monetary equilibrium? As we have seen, any money growth factor above results in a strictly lower value for x, reducing the value of the social welfare function. Notice that those who are able to use credit in their current transactions are essentially "protected" against in ‡ation: Even though in ‡ation raises the opportunity cost of holding money, those who have their trades reported receive an o¤setting interest payment, completely eliminating the opportunity cost of holding money provided that R = Even though we restricted the monetary authority to intervene through the credit/payment system, we have shown that it is possible to a¤ect the sellers'incentives to extend credit as well as the buyers'incentives to fully repay their debts.
CONCLUSION
We have taken the view that …at money complements the use of credit as a means of payment and have characterized the way in which monetary policy a¤ects the functioning of the credit system. In our analysis, credit arrangements are constrained by the borrowers' inability to commit to fully repay their debts and by the available record-keeping technology.
We have characterized the equilibrium allocations of a pure credit economy and have shown that (due to a technological restriction) there is a social role for …at money. Then, we have shown that an active monetary policy is su¢ cient for relaxing the credit constraints.
Finally, we have shown that if credit arrangements are essential, then the optimal monetary policy entails a positive in ‡ation rate in order to induce cooperation in the credit system.
One limitation of our analysis is that we explicitly abstracted from other aspects of monetary policy. Speci…cally, we restricted attention to the design of policies that aim at in ‡uencing the e¤ectiveness of credit arrangements. However, our monetary mechanism allowed us to provide a useful characterization of the interactions between optimal monetary policy and credit arrangements.
any (x; y). This implies that there can be no credit in equilibrium. As a result, the unique stationary monetary equilibrium is one in whichx is traded in each bilateral meeting in the decentralized market. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5
Condition (25) implies
Because the utility function u : R + ! R + is strictly concave, we conclude that x x as claimed. In particular, if R = 1 , then from (27) we have x =x. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6
From (22) and (25), we have that
which means that the maximum daytime consumption (in an unconstrained equilibrium)
for a buyer who is paired with an unconnected seller isx < q . Since the socially e¢ cient allocation can be implemented only as an unconstrained equilibrium, (33) implies that such an allocation is infeasible. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7
De…ne the function ' ( ) by (1) > 0, we have that ( ) is strictly increasing for any 1. This means that for the value such that ' ( ) = 0 we also have that ( ) > 0. Therefore, we conclude that (x; y; z) = (x; q ;x), withx given by
is an unconstrained stationary monetary equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8
Given condition (32), it follows immediately from Proposition 5. Q.E.D.
